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Protecting the Right to Vote: A Model Voter
Challenge Statute
In June 1968, primaries were held in certain wards of New Haven,
Connecticut, for seats on the Democratic Town Committee. Candidates
endorsed by the Democratic Reform Movement, a group of supporters
of Senator Eugene McCarthy, were challenging the tight control over
the party apparatus held by the Chairman of the Democratic Town
Committee. As the day progressed, a large number of voters-most of
them young and recently registered supporters of the insurgent candi-
dates-were challenged by local polling officials as not being qualified
to vote. All the challenges occurred in wards where the regular party
organization had appointed a majority of the election officials. Many of
those challenged were forced to show draft cards, drivers licenses, apart-
ment leases, and tax receipts before being allowed to vote. Some were
kept from voting entirely. One medical student had to return home
for his apartment lease. When he returned to the polling place, offi-
cials demanded his birth certificate, which was not immediately avail-
able, and he was not permitted to vote.
Three weeks later, New Haven Superior Court Judge Joseph W.
Bogdanski found that election officials in the ward where most chal-
lenges had occurred' had "acted in concert by unreasonable, arbitrary
and illegal means" to prevent some twenty supporters of the insurgent
candidate "from exercising their right to vote," harassing some and
"selectively preventing" others from voting.2 As the regular party can-
didate had a margin of only eighteen votes, the court acknowledged
that the insurgent candidate would have won had the plaintiffs been
allowed to cast their ballots.
Under Connecticut election contest laws, however, a court faced with
evidence of misuse of the challenge power is permitted only "to order
any voting machine used . . . to be opened and a recount of votes
cast."3 A recount would obviously have been worthless in this instance.
Because he found himself unable to order a new election or to add the
1. The 20 plaintiffs in the suit were all from New Haven's Second Ward, since that
was the only ward in which the number of persons rejected as voters was large enough
to alter the results of the ward primary. They sued under a section in Connecticut's
election laws allowing any voter or candidate to contest an election. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 9-449 (1958).
2. Salter v. Kaplovitz, No. 1116581 (New Haven Superior Court, June 18, 1968). at 3.
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-449 (1958).
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plaintiffs' votes to the total of the insurgent candidate, Judge Bogdan-
ski, with admitted regret, ruled for the defendants.
The New Haven case illustrates two aspects of the challenge process
which are common to every state in the nation: the potential which
the challenge power offers for controlling the right to vote and the
inadequacy of legal remedies available for dealing with abuses of such
power.
I. Current Challenge Systems4
Forty-eight states provide for the challenge of prospective voters at
the polls on election day.5 Responsibility for conducting the election
is generally vested in an election board for each precinct or ward, com-
posed of three to five appointed officers.0 The election statutes usually
4. The subject of the voter challenge and election board powers of determination
has been dealt with only collaterally in a few works, most of which were published
more than thirty years ago. See, e.g., J. HARass, ELECTioN ADmuNmATIOx iN Tre UNiTED
STATES 229-S6 (1934); E. LOGAN, SuPERvistoN OF TnE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS AND RL-ruNs
88-92 (1928). These works deal extensively with election law administration in the states
but say very little about the statutes themselves or voter challenges. For a very brief
but more recent survey of the nation's election laws, see C.E. SMI, VOTING AND ELEc-
TION LAws (1960), which deals with voter challenges, at 41.
Two excellent early volumes dealing with election law and court decisions relating
thereto are G. MCCRARY, ELCTIONS (4th ed. 1897), and F. BRIGHITLY, LEADING CASES ON
ELECMONS (1871).
5. In Hawaii and Vermont, challenge rights for general elections exist only before
election day. HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 11-15 to 11-26 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 201-210
(1958). See also note 16 infra. Such a system seems to have a number of serious disad-
vantages. For example, it does not take account of the many unavoidable clerical errors
with which most registration sheets are filled. Such mistakes may create serious con-
fusion on election day. Some voters might claim on election day that their names were
mistakenly omitted from the sheet or that there was a mistake in the listed address. To
cover such a contingency, one might require that all voters check for such errors before
election day if they wish to vote; however, such a requirement assumes an interest in
the franchise and an awareness of the electoral processes which most people lack. See
p. 678 infra. On the other hand, allowing such unlisted voters to vote without challenge
obviously opens the door to fraud.
Moreover, since the registration process is closely connected to political parties and
their leaders, those in a position to challenge names on the registration lists--the town
Registrar, or the Board of Selectmen, or the various prospective poll officials--would
undoubtedly refrain from doing so if it served their political purposes. Thus, when
election day arrived, there would be no way to prevent illegal votes from getting through.
6. E.g., Arizona-3 members; California-5 members (can vary according to popula-
tion); Iowa--'5 members; Missouri-4 members. Qualifications required of election board
officials are usually literacy and sometimes residency in the precinct in which they are
working. See, eg., CAL. ELECTIONS CODE, §§ 1607, 1611 (West 1961) (read and vrite
English; voter of precinct in "same general area'); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 31 (1955)
("write with reasonable rapidity in a legible form'). Illinois requires only that the
officials be "capable and discreet." IL.t ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 13-1 (Smith-Hurd 196 ). The
chairman of the election board is called by a variety of names, such as Moderator (Con-
necticut), Inspector (Arizona), Judge (Missouri), and Warden (Maine). The officials are
usually appointed by the chief election authority of the town, city, or county. e.g., the
town Registrar in Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-229 (1958). the County Clerk
in Colorado, COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-9-1 (1958). the County Board of Commissioners
in Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 13-1 (Smith-Hurd 1965).
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attempt to make such boards bipartisan by appointing officers from
lists submitted by the local central committees of the two major par-
ties; 7 since most election boards have an odd number of members, the
party controlling a majority is often alternated by precinct.8
Each member of the election board is usually required to challenge
anyone he "knows or suspects"9 or has "good reason to suspect or be-
lieve"'1 to lack certain qualifications. Such a requirement, however,
has had little or no impact on the challenge process itself, since few
states provide sanctions for ignoring a "good reason" standard."
Grounds upon which voters may be challenged are listed in varying
degrees of detail or omitted entirely.12 The most common grounds for
7, ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 125 (1959); COLO. RIv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-9-1, 49-9-6 (1963); NED.
REv. STAT. § 32-404 (1952).
Some writers argue that the value of having a bipartisan board is at times minimal
since officials from both parties may share similar interests. See E. LOGAN, supra note 4,
at 67; J. HARRis, supra note 4, at 133, 149.
8. COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 49-9-4 (1963).
9. IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.79 (1949); Nm. REv. STAT. § 32-467 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 19.15-19.18 (1964) ("know, suspect or believe').
10. ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.210 (1962) ("good reason to suspect"); FA. SrAT. ANN.,§ 101.23 (1960) ("if reason to believe'); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.727 (1967) ("know
or have good reason to suspect").
11. If the statute establishes a duty to challenge when the official has "good reason"
to believe the voter unqualified, a willful failure to challenge would be covered by the
penalty section on "willful failure to perform any statutory duty," which appears In
most election laws. E.g., Micas. COMp. ANN. § 168.931(m) (1967) and note 41 infra.
However, the challenger is not expressly warned by the challenge section of the sanctions
for failure to follow the "good reason" standard.
12. States which do not collect in a list the grounds for challenge typically provide
that anyone who is not a "qualified elector of the precinct" may be challenged. E.g.,
MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.727 (1967). While the exact definition of what constitutes
a "qualified elector" is usually not spelled out in detail, it is not left entirely to the
challenger's imagination. The basic definition can usually be found In another section,
e.g., id. § 168.10, which, though not specified in the challenge provision, usually appears
as a cross reference in annotated versions of the election code. The "qualified elector"
provision may itself refer to still other parts of the law: ". . . any person who possesses
the qualifications of an elector as prescribed in section 1 of article 2 of the state consti-
tution and who has resided in the city or township 30 days." Id. In turn, the Michigan
Constitution, art. 2, §§ 1, 2 provides:
Sec. 1. Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years,
who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local
residence provided by law, shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any election
except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define resi-
dence for voting purposes.
Sec. 2. The legislature may by law exclude persons from voting because of mental
incompetence or commitment to a jail or penal institution.
Additionally, in the provisions on registration, the "qualifications of electors" are again
set out. Id. § 168.492.
While such extensive (or, at least, extended) definition of the grounds for challenge
might be thought to be complete, this is probably not the case. None of these sections
provide that a voter is "not qualified" or "may be challenged" if he has voted before
in the same election ("repeater') or is not the person he claims to be ("identity'),
provisions common to those statutes which spell out the grounds for challenge. Sea note
13 infra. Michigan plainly intends that such persons not vote. See the criminal penalties
which attach to falsely impersonating another person, Mics. Comp. LAws ANN. § 168.931(f)(1967), using a fictitious name, id. § (g), voting in a precinct in which one does not
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a challenge are: apparent lack of registration (name not on registration
list), age, alienage, non-fulfillment of residency requirements, repeat-
ing (voting more than once in that election), identity (prospective voter
not whom he claims to be), conviction for felony (without restoration
of civil rights), betting on the election, bribery, and illiteracy.13
A. Quasi-judicial v. Ministerial Boards
The states divide about evenly on giving election boards discretion-
ary powers to pass on challenges. Nineteen states' 4 give their boards
quasi-judicial 5 powers to reject a challenged vote (usually by a major-
ity vote of the board). Twenty-five states' prescribe merely ministe-
reside, id. § (i), or voting more than once, id. § fi), as well as to violating the blanket
prohibition against casting a ballot when one is not a "qualified and registered elector."
Id. § (h). Therefore, an election official is almost certainly permitted to challenge on
"identity" or "repeater" grounds and, in fact, would probably be violating his statutory
duty if he failed to challenge someone whom he had good reason to suspect came
within these grounds. Id. §§ 168.727, 168.931(m). The statute's failure to list tie grounds
simply in one place, however, makes the law needlessly uncertain. Cf. TEx. ELEcno.v
CODE, art. 8.09 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-1309 (1955), as amended (Cum. Supp. 196$);
S.D. CODE, § 16.1010 (1939); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 250.350 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT., § 393.303
(1965); Mss. CODE ANN. § 14:2-3244 (1957); MD. ANN. CODE, § 33:16-14 (1954), as amended
(Cum. Supp. 1968); AREs. STAT. ANN., § 3-916 (1956); LA. REv. STAT. ANn. § 18:580 (1967).
18. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-921 (1956) (identity; residency; repeating; felony.
not pardoned; betting; literacy); CAL. ELEcrioNs CODE § 14240 ,(West 1951) (identity;
residency; repeating; alienage; conviction for "infamous crime"; conviction for em-
bezzlement or misappropriation of public money); DaL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 §§ 4944, 4946
(1953) (identity; bribery); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 23-1220 (1967) (identit); idiocy or
insanity; repeating; felony, not pardoned); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-18 (1933) (identity:
residency; citizenship; age; repeating). In at least one state, a voter can be challenged
for dueling. Wis. STAT. ANn. § 6.92(7) (1957).
14. ARmZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16.922 to .926 (1956), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1969); Anx.
STAT. ANN. § 3-916 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22-23 (1960), as amended (Cum. Supp.
1969); IDAHo CODE ANN., § 34-1025 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.408, 25-411 (1949); Ky.
REv. STAT. §§ 118.250, 118.260 (1960); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-560 (1951); MD. AN%. CODE.
§ 33:16-14 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 14:2-3244 (1937) (cf.
§§ 14.2-3129, 3108.5, 3170 (primaries)); NEv. REv. STAT. § 293.303 (19653); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:15-18, -19, -20, -21, -24 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-88 (1954), as amended (Cum.
Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (Page 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. Lit. 25, §§ 8050,
3053 (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-353, 23-383 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1309 to 2-1311
(1955), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-253, 254 (1954); WAsH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 29.59. 010. -040, -050 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1968); W. N'A. CODE A.%:.
§ 3-141 (1966).
15. "Quasi-judicial" will be used in this Note in the sense defined by the Court in
Bair v. Struck, 29 Mont. 45, 51, 74 P. 69, 72 (1903): "When the law, in words or by
implication, commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them,
not in a way in which it specifically directs, but after a discretion In its nature judicial,
the function is termed quasi-judicial."
16. ALA. CODE tit. 17, §§ 187-91 (1959); ALAsNA STAT., §§ 15.15.130, 15.15210 (1922);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-13-1 to 49-13-6 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-137 (1962);
HAWAn REv. LAws §§ 11-15 to 11-26 (1955); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 49.79 to 49.81 (1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 18-5 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-5019, 5020 (19-49),
as amended (Supp. 1968); ME. RLv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 863, 925(1), 1212 (1965); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 54, §§ 85, 96 (1954), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1968); Micit. Coir. LAm
ANN. § 168.727 (1967); MA'WN. STAT. ANN. § 204.17 (1959); NED. RXv. STAT. §§ 32-467 to
-478 (1952); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69:16 (1955); N.Y. ELEcrioN LAW, §§ 17:225 MfcKinney
1964); N.D. CE&r. CODE §§ 16-12-14 (1960), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1967); OrL.A. STAT.
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rial' 7 functions to their boards, requiring that the Board issue a ballot
to every challenged voter who has fulfilled various statutory require-
ments.' In six states19 the system is a mixture of the two, the officials
exercising quasi-judicial powers as to voters challenged on some grounds
and ministerial powers as to those challenged on other grounds.
Statutes conferring quasi-judicial authority often provide for an in-
formal trial, with the calling of witnesses on each side, the filing of
affidavits and counter-affidavits, and a decision which "may appear
right from the proof."20 Other states require the voter to answer ques-
tions "truly and fully" under oath, to take a general oath as to his
qualifications to vote,2' or to secure written affidavits from two resi-
dents of the precinct, 22 but still reserve the final decision to the discre-
tion of the board.23 The central weakness of these statutes is the power
ANN. tit. 26, § 256 (1955); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 250.350, 250.400 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 17-19-24, 17-19-27 (1956), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1967); S.D. CoDE § 16.1010 (1939),
Tax. ELECTION CODE art. 8.09 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-18 (1953), VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 1042 (1968), §§ 203-210 (1968); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.92 to 6.95 (1967); WYO. STAT.
ANN., §§ 22:118.107, 118.108 (1957), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1967). Note that Vermont
and Hawaii are included as ministerial states, since their election boards have no discre-
tionary powers on election day to refuse votes. In fact, neither state provides for challenge
procedures on election day itself, but only prior to election day, with the exception that
during a party primary in Hawaii, the challenge procedure is provided for and the
election board is given discretion to determine the challenges. See HAWAII REv. LAWs
§ 11-103 (1955).
17. "Ministerial" is used in this Note in the sense defined by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14, 74 A. 392, 395 (1909). A ministerial duty Is
"one regarding which nothing is left to discretion-a simple and definite duty, imposed
by law, and arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist." Accord, City of
Tacoma v. Peterson, 165 Wash. 461, 5 P.2d 1022 (1931).
18. The distinction between quasi-judicial and ministerial boards goes to their dis-
cretion to decide the validity of a challenge and thereupon to give or withhold the ballot.
Regardless of this distinction, states often impose a duty on the officials to inahe dial-
lenges when they have reasonable grounds to do so; citizens and "party challengers"
are also usually allowed to challenge on the same basis. See notes 9 & 10 supra. While
this will require making a judgment as to whether there are grounds to challenge, It
does not amount to a quasi-judicial function, since it does not determine whether or
not the challenged voter will be allowed to cast a ballot. Cf. note 92 infra. Similarly, a
quasi-judicial board is not "ministerial" because it has no discretion to accept the ballot
of a challenged voter who has refused to follow the statutory requirements (taking an
oath, answering questions, etc.); its discretionary powers are to reject ballots of voters
who have fulfilled those requirements but whom it nonetheless believes are not qualified
to vote on other grounds.
19. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 14240-50 (West 1961), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1968);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-232, 9-232(a) (1958) (cf. id. §§ 9-170, 9-171, 9-172); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 4944-46 (1953), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 111.550,
114.210, 114.220 (1963); MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. §§ 23-1220 to -1228 (1947); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3-2-50, 3-3-13, 3-3-20, Subsections A(12), (13), (17) (1953), as amended (Gum.
Supp. 1967).
For a table of classifications-quasi-judicial, ministerial, or "hybrid"--for all 50 states,
see Appendix.
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:15-18, 19:15-24 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 118.260 (1960).
21. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-410, -411 (1949); Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (Page
1960).
22. LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 18:580 (1951).
23. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.19 (Page 1960).
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they vest in local officials who, on occasion, may find it in their polit-
ical interest to misuse the power to determine challenges in order to
prevent qualified voters from casting ballots.24 Criminal or civil pen-
alties may deter some abuses, "5 but no remedy other than a new elec-
tion can restore to every person whose vote has been wrongfully re-
jected the full value of his ballot.26
Two states with quasi-judicial challenge systems overcome part of
this problem by providing that if the election board refuses a vote, the
challenged voter's ballot is marked and set aside to be ruled on by an-
other body.27 Two problems remain, however. First, the fact that the
local board has already ruled against their right to vote may discourage
voters from casting a special ballot.2 8 Second, determination of the le-
gality of challenged ballots seems inadequately insulated from local po-
litical pressures.
In states which confer only ministerial powers on their election
boards, challenged voters who satisfy certain statutory requirements are
allowed to vote without further delay. Although the procedural steps
a voter must follow vary greatly,2 most systems involve answering
questions as to one's qualifications, taking one or more oaths, and, less
frequently, producing supporting affidavits.
While the ministerial structure has some advantages on its face, it
suffers from serious infirmities. One difficulty is that states which do
24. See p. 677 infra.
25. See pp. 669-71 infra.
26. If the election is important, the possibility of criminal or civil liability attaching
may not keep some election officials from wrongly denying voters the ballot, provided
there are no other means by which their handiwork can be undone. Election contest
suits, conceived of as the judicial check on official abuse, are generally inieffective in
practice. See pp. 672-73 infra. And in every situation in which there is no contest
suit which results in the holding of a new election, those voters who were improperly
denied a ballot will have lost some measure of their right to vote; the right to a secret
ballot, for example, frequently is a nullity in an election contest suit. Yet, for a number
of reasons, a new election is a disfavored remedy. See note 51 infra.
27. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 29.59.010, -040, -050 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1963);
IV. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-41 (1966). In Washington, the ballot is put in a sealed envelope
and sent over to the canvassing board. If the challenger requests, the canvassing board
rules on the challenge. If the challenger fails to make such a request, the ballot is
accepted and counted. In West Virginia, the ballot is marked and put aside, to be
ultimately ruled on by the County Court.
28. See p. 678 infra for discussion of voter apathy.
29. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 54, § 85 (1962); N.Y. Ez.rcrioN LAw § 17:22.1
(McKinney 1964). In Massachusetts, if a voter is challenged he is allowed to vote after
taking the following general oath: "You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you are the
identical person whom you represent yourself to be, that you are registered in this
precinct (or town) and that you have not voted at this election." In New York, the
voter must go through a three-stage process. First, he must take a preliminary oath.
promising to answer all questions "fully and truly." Then, he must answer the questions
prescribed in the statute for each particular ground for the challenge. If the officials
are still dissatisfied, and the voter insists on voting, he must take a general oath (similar
to the Massachusetts oath). The precinct board must then allow him to vote.
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not give their local election officers the power to refuse ballots often
attempt to guard against fraud by requiring a challenged voter to pro-
duce one or more affidavits signed by qualified electors swearing to his
qualifications. Some states impose particularly formidable requirements
for these supporting affidavits. In Alabama the challenged voter must
produce an affidavit by an "elector personally known to some one of
the inspectors to be a qualified elector and a freeholder and house-
holder." 30 The affiant has to swear, among other things, that he has
known the challenged voter "for the last two years preceding this elec-
tion," that the latter has been a resident of the state for that time, has
resided in the county for one year and the precinct for three months
preceding the election. The affiant must also swear that he is himself
a qualified elector, freeholder, and householder. 81 Thus, by the very act
of challenging, an official is able to keep the ballot from any voter who
is not willing to expend more than a minimal effort in voting or who
is not able, despite his eagerness to vote, to produce an affiant "free-
holder and householder" personally known to a voting official.0 2
An additional problem is that some ministerial boards have areas of
discretion so wide that, as with quasi-judicial boards, it is easy for po-
litically motivated appointees to misuse their power. 3 Yet the basic
30. ALA. CODE tit. 17, §§ 187-191 (1959).
31. Id. A "freeholder" is one who owns real estate, either as a life estate or In fee
simple. A "householder" is the head or master of a family. See also Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 114.210 (1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN., §§ 22:118.107, 118.108 (1957), as amended (Cum.
Supp. 1967); Tax. ELEarION CODE art. 8.09. Wyoming and Missouri require, In addition
to the challenged voter's oath, two affidavits signed by qualified electors In the precinct,
swearing to his qualifications. In Texas, the challenged voter must get the oath of a
person who is a "well-known" resident of the precinct. It is apparently up to the precinct
board to determine who is and who is not "well-known."
32. Although no suit has been brought challenging the constitutionality of this
statute under the United States or Alabama constitutions, its validity Is doubtful. The
holding of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Queenan v. Russell, 839 S.W2d 475, 477
(Ky. 1960), represents the general rule in the state courts: "[The legislature] cannot so
frame the regulations as to deny the right to vote, either directly or by rendering Its
exercise so difficult and inconvenient as to amount to a denial." In Russell, the state's
burdensome absentee ballot procedures were held to be invalid under Section 6 of
the Kentucky Constitution, which is roughly similar to Article 1, Section 83 of the
Alabama Constitution. Cf. Wilkinson v. Queen, 269 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1954). The cases
upholding the right to vote as guaranteed by the federal constitution are discussed
infra note 62. State voting regulations which, directly or indirectly, deny citizens tile
right to vote have been stricken down on numerous occasions. Harman v. Forssenlus,
380 U.S. 528 (1965); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 821 U.S.
649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 288 U.S. 317
(1915).
33. For example, in New York, which is recognized as having purely ministerial
election boards, People v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 45, 66 (1863), the challenged voter must answer
all questions put to him "fully and truly." New York election officials are also called upon
to determine the genuineness of a felon's pardon before allowing him to vote. The
court in People v. Pease, supra, pointed out that although the statutory language is
not precise on this point, it would seem that such determinations could prevent the
challenged voter from casting his ballot. For other states with similar ambiguities, see
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shortcoming of most ministerial systems is that they provide no device
for identifying ballots illegally cast by challenged voters who are will-
ing to swear falsely in order to vote. Thus, the chances that any suit
contesting the election result will be successful are greatly reduced.34
B. Criminal and Civil Sanctions
The classification of an election board as quasi-judicial or ministerial
may affect what sanctions can be invoked against it. At common law
an election official is liable for damages if he neglects or refuses to per-
form ministerial duties as required by statute.3r When election officials
are given discretion in the determination of challenges, however, "they
are entitled to the same protection as other judicial officers"36 and are
liable only on proof of willfulness or malice.3 7
Criminal prosecutions for wrongful behavior regarding challenges
are infrequent. Not only are local prosecutors likely to be subject to
political pressures similar to those which led to the voting abuse in the
first place,3s but even the willing prosecutor will find statutory sanc-
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-13-6 (1963); MNN. STAT. ANN § 204.17 (1959); NEn. REv. STAT.
§ 32-469 (1952); Avis. STAT. ANN. § 6.94 (1965).
34. The problems of proof created by the inseparability of invalid from valid ballots
are discussed at pp. 672-75 infra. The system in Maine, which is perhaps the best
ministerial statute, overcomes this difficulty but provides an inefficacious remedv. After a
challenge, the voter's and challenger's names and the reasons for the challenge are
recorded on the ballot, which is then counted along with the others. Only if the
number of challenged ballots is large enough to affect the election results is the validity
of each challenge ruled upon by "the Governor and Council." Yet, if they find a
sufficiently large number of challenges to be valid, the same problem arises here as in
other states: the only remedy is for one of the candidates to sue in court, without specific
provision for the calling of a new election. IE. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 863, 925(l),
1212 (1965).
35. E.g., Frank v. Eaton, 231 N.Y.S. 477, 479 (1928); Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass.
350 (1814); Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Mo. 479 (1862); Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544
(1866). Cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1926).
36. T. CooEY, CONSTTUIONAL LrrATONS 681 (2d ed. 1871).
37. Where election boards act in part quasi-judidially and in part ministerially, the
functions are treated separately under the appropriate standard. Thus, "where there is
a ministerial act to be done by persons who on other occasions act judicially, the refusal
to do the ministerial act is equally actionable, as if no judicial functions were on any
occasion entrusted to them." Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420, 431 (1875), quoting
Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoull 9 Cl. & Fin. 251 (1842).
38. Since June 1968, no criminal charges have been filed against members of the
election board involved in the New Haven case, despite clear violations of several sec-
tions of Connecticut election law, which specify criminal penalties. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9-855, 9-361 (1958).
Where the district attorney is of the same party as the alleged election law violator,
prosecutions will probably be rare. Even where the prosecutor belongs to an opposing
party, he often will be restrained in prosecuting election law violations in the expectation
that when positions are reversed, the favor will be returned. Some commentators argue
that in most cases, the theory of opposing political parties acting as watchdogs for the
other is a myth. See J. HAIuu, supra note 4, at 126-48, particularly at 133: "The theory
that each side will watch the other is not valid, for many election frauds are committed
with the mutual connivance of the election officers of both parties. The opposition of
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tions inadequate.39 Only a few states have provisions dealing directly
with invalid acceptance or rejection of challenged votes40 or with the
frivolous and indiscriminate use of the challenge power for the pur-
pose of annoying or delaying voters.41
The advantage of civil sanctions is that they can be invoked by the
aggrieved party without dependence on a district attorney's initiative.
Court have disagreed, however, whether a willfulness requirement is
wise in civil cases. On the one hand, imposing liability for honest
errors of judgment seems unfair5 2 may discourage citizens from serv-
ing as officials, 43 and may influence officials to be overly cautious in
exercising their powers. On the other hand, the difficulty of proving
willfulness may effectively preclude the voter from judicial recognition
of his rights. Some courts have therefore concluded that any erroneous
denial of the ballot, irrespective of malice, should be a compensable
wrong.44 Judicial authorities nevertheless agree that the need for a
the two political machines to each other, particularly in the large cities, is often a myth,
and can never be relied upon ... to safeguard the ballot box." See also E. LoGAN, Supra
note 4, at 60-81.
39. Even in the rare cases where a state statute is directed against challenge abuses
(as opposed to other voting frauds), courts will seize upon the traditional justifications
for interpreting penal statutes strictly. See State v. Palanque, 133 La. 36, ,11, 62 So.
224, 226 (1913); Brown v. Haselman, 79 Ark. 213, 95 S.W. 136 (1906).
40. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-21-34 (1963), making it a crime for any election
judge to "willfully and maliciously refuse or neglect to receive the ballot of amy quali-
fied registered elector who has taken or offered to take the oath prescribed. . . " ALA.
CODE tit. 17, § 315 (1959): $100 fine and up to six months hard labor for willfully ex-
duding vote, "knowing" the challenged voter is entitled to vote, or for accepting a vote
without following statutory requirements for challenge; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-9-7 (1966).
making a misdemeanor of wrongful refusal or allowance of votes punishable by a $1,000
fine or one year in jail, maximum, or both.
41. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-9-7 (1966), $100 fine or 90 days in jail for malicious
or frivolous challenges; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 56 § 31 (1962): "Any person challeng-
ing a qualified voter for purposes of intimidation or of ascertaining how he voted, or
for any other illegal purpose shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100"; Micat.
Costp. LAWS ANN. § 168.727 (1967), making it a misdemeanor to assert indiscriminate
challenges without good cause for the purpose of "annoying or delaying voters."
If willingness can be proven, however, prosecutors may invoke three types of common
provisions: (1) knowingly violating the election code, ILL. ANN. STAr. ch. '16 § 29A-1
(Smith-Hurd 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 3548, 3350 (1963); (2) willful neglect or
refusal to perform statutory duty, CAL. ELECrIONS CODE § 29002 (West 1961); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 9-355 (1958); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3275 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34.33
(1964); (3) election fraud, Amiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 16:1310 (1956); PA. S-rAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 3525 (1963).
42. E.g., Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479, 484 (1862).
43. Blake v. Mason, 82 Conn. 324, 329, 73 A. 782, 784 (1909): "[1]t would be
unjust to apply a principle of personal responsibility to honest and fair conduct under
such conditions, unwise to interpose so serious an obstacle in the way of the enforcement
of proper restraints upon the abuse of the elective franchise, and impolitic to countenance
so effective a discouragement of honest and responsible men from accepting a position
attendant with such hazards."
44. See Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350, 354 (1814), which is, despite its age, the
most direct statement by a court of this point of view. The court warned that, given
the difficulties of proving malice, if election officials were not held absolutely liable, the
challenged voter may be "entirely shut out from a judicial investigation of his right"
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sanction when the wrongful act has been done willfully is especially
great.45 Damages in such a case are punitive rather than compensatory,
"visited on the evil doer for his misconduct rather than as compensa-
tion to the party who has suffered the loss. The wrong primarily is
against the public, not the individual."'40
G. Judicial Remedies
Statutory provisions for contesting elections in court and equitable
relief theoretically offer the citizen who is dissatisfied with the conduct
of an election a method to alter the results. In point of fact, statutory
inadequacies, judicial reluctance to order new elections, and the prac-
tical difficulty of mounting an election suit make these remedies highly
ineffective.
Available remedies, such as mandamus, declaratory judgment, and
injunction,47 are rarely effective in preventing voter challenge abuses.
There are obvious practical difficulties in securing relief before the
polls close on election day. Where prompt court action is achieved,
election officers may be compelled by mandamus to discharge the min-
isterial duties required by statute, but mandamus is not available to
order a particular decision on a voter challenge made by a quasi-judi-
cial election board.4 8 Once the results are in, most courts are reluctant
and may be "prevented, for his life, from exercising a constitutional privilege." Id. Mas-
sachusetts is still one of the few states with an absolute liability rule, as Lincoln v. Hap-
good has never been overruled or modified. See Blanchard v. Steams, 46 Mass. (5 Met.)
298 (1842) (selectmen may be liable in damages for nonmalicious disqualification of voter):
Lamed v. Wheeler, 140 Mass. 390, 5 N.E. 290 (1886) (a selectman, having only ministerial
powers, erased the name of a duly qualified voter; held, liable for damages, though no
wilfullness proven).
45. See Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Mld. 479 (1862); Blake v. mason, 82 Conn. 324. 73 A.
782 (1909); Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 (1814); Morris v. Colorado Midland Ry..
48 Colo. 147, 109 P. 430 (1910). Note that even Massachusetts, which still applies the
absolute liability rule at least in theory, recognizes the importance of a finding of malice
in the determination of damages. In order to discourage spurious suits, the court in
Hapgood, for example, advised the jury to have regard for the "disposition and temper
of mind" discoverable in the act complained of;, hence, if no malice were found, only
nominal damages should be awarded. 11 Mass. at 357. See G. McCRAYX. supra note 4. at
§§ 289-301.
46. Morris v. Colorado Midland Ry., 48 Colo. 147, 150, 109 P. 430, 431 (1910). This
is one of the more unusual voter damage suits. The plaintiff here sued a railwa) coai-
pany for its negligence in causing plaintiff's arrival to be so delayed that le minLd his
opportunity to vote. The plaintiff asked the court to award him $10.000 for being de-
prived of the right to vote. The court, finding no malice, ruled that the right to vote
is in no sense "an asset of commercial value. It is a privilege bestowed by law, which
although of paramount importance, is not such a privilege as can be measured by, or
paid for, in dollars and cents, or speculated upon for pecuniary gain." Id.
47. In Brown v. Thurman, 201 Tenn. 474, 300 SAV.2d 883 (1957), an injunction to
force impounding of absentee ballots was denied as "an infringement upon authority
vested in the precinct judges of the election." Id. at 477, 300 S.W-2d at 884. See G. Mc-
CRARY, supra note 4, at § 387.
48. Election boards "may perhaps be required by mandamus to perfonn merely min-
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to involve themselves in the electoral process, especially prior to or in
lieu of resort to statutory remedies.49
Some states have specific provisions under which any voter or can-
didate can contest an election, either to instate the candidate who the
court decides should have won 0 or to declare the office vacant, thereby
giving rise to the need for a new election. 1 However, a number of fac-
tors prevent contest suits from offering an effective method to affect
election results. First, courts are generally very hesitant to overturn
election results.52 Second, the uniform rule is that the number of voter
challenges which were incorrectly decided must be large enough to af-
fect the outcome of the election.5 3 It may be very difficult to assemble
evidence of a sufficient magnitude of abuse, especially when it consists
of the improper exclusion of voters.5 4 Third, once in court the plaintiff
faces serious difficulties in proving that the election was invalid. Under
most quasi-judicial and ministerial systems, once the ballot of an un-
qualified voter is received there is no way to identify it, so reliance
must be placed on oral testimony by witnesses whose credibility is sub-
isterial acts in a particular way, and they may be required to exercise their judicial
functions, but they cannot be required by a common law mandamus to decide In aparticular manner." People ex rel. Griffith v. Bundy, 107 Col. 102, 105, 109 P.2d 201, 263(1941). See also Comley ex rel. Harrison v. Wilson, 116 Conn. 36, 163 A. 465 (1932) (a
moderator refused to exercise his quasi-judicial powers to recanvass, despite differences
between the number of voters checked on registry lists and the number recorded on the
voting machines; held, mandamus denied; the moderator's refusal is within his power
and not an abuse of discretion); Corbett v. Naylor, 25 R.I. 520, 57 A. 303 (1904) (man-
damus was denied in suit to compel a moderator to determine which way a vote shouldbe counted, where moderator had used his own proper judgment). See Note, The Role of
the Courts in Election Contest Proceedings, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1181, 1185.86 (1964).
49. See G. MCCRARY, supra note 4, at § 396. Further, after election day, the use of
mandamus runs into some serious legal difficulties even with ministerial boards. For
example, mandamus can compel only acts which can be done voluntarily. After election
day, the election board legally ceases to exist and thus, theoretically, cannot voluntarily
do anything. For further discussion of this and other related problems, see Note, supra
note 48, 48 MINN. L. Rav. 1181, 1186-89.
50. In some jurisdictions this remedy is available in an election contest suit, E.g., CAL.ELERONS CODE § 20087 (West 1961); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:29-10 (1964). In others It can
be sought in a quo warranto proceeding. E.g., Micu. CoMip. LAWS §§ 168.747-49 (1967):
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 294.04 (1958). See also G. McCRuAR, supra note 4, §§ 393, 395, 396;
Note, supra note 48, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1181, 1183.
51. E.g., CAL. ELEcrioNs CODE §§ 20086, 20116 (West 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:3-23,19:29-9 (1964). Calling a new election is the less attractive alternative since it involves
additional expenses to the state. Furthermore, the availability of a new election serves
to encourage an entrenched political organization to cause errors if it fears It will lose
the election, since it is likely to be better equipped, financially and politically, to turn
out its own voters in the second election than is a group of insurgents.
52. E.g., Teebe v. Smith, 108 Cal. 101, 107, 41 P. 454, 455 (1895).53. E.g., CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 20021d, -e (West 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:29-le(1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-1001 (1952).
54. The difficulties of contest statutes are discussed in Note, supra note 48, 48 MINN.
L. REV., 1181. For a lengthy description of an extraordinary election contest controversy,
see Thomas, Election Boards and Voting Machines, State of Oklahoma, 4 TULSA L. REv.
137 (1967).
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stantially reduced by their admission that they have engaged in illegal
activity (voting when they were not qualified to do so) or on circum-
stantial evidence.55 Still other problems of proof are encountered when
the plaintiff alleges that voters were improperly excluded, which theo-
retically can occur only if the state has quasi-judicial election boards.50
The voters who testify must be willing to reveal in open court the can-
didate for whom they would have voted, thereby forfeiting the ano-
nymity which the secret ballot is designed to assure to all citizens.
Moreover, and partially in consequence of this lack of secrecy, it is
practically very onerous to mount a successful election contest suit.
The legwork required to bring the New Haven suit, especially locat-
ing those voters who had been wrongly denied the ballot and convinc-
ing them it would be worth their time and money to contest the offi-
cials' action, was made possible only by the support of a determined
group of insurgents.67 Most voters simply do not consider their single
vote very important, 8 so statutory schemes which rely on voter-initi-
ated suits alone to contest the validity of elections in which voter chal-
lenges have been misused are largely ineffectual.
D. Federal Remedies
Despite a number of federal statutes which make it illegal to inter-
fere with voters casting their ballots6 9 there have been few prosecutions
not involving allegations of racially-motivated discrimination, perhaps
because of doubts as to the constitutionality of some of the national
legislation.60 While there is no question as to the validity of federal
55. In most states a voter's declaration of the candidate for whom he voted Is classified
as hearsay and is inadmissible as independent evidence; instead, very clear circumstantial
evidence must exist before a vote can be deducted from the total of an) candidate. E.g.,
Hawkins v. Sanguinetti, 98 Cal. App. 2d 278, 220 P.2d 58 (1950); Smith v. Thomas,
121 Cal. 533, 54 P. 71 (1898). The Model Statute, which does not provide for election
contest suits, overcomes a similar problem in civil damage actions by creating the re-
buttable presumption that the unqualified voter cast his ballot for the defendant. See
Model Statute § 6(b)(8) infra. Generally, states do not at present allow such a presumption
in contest suits. See, e.g., Singletary v. Kelley, 242 Cal. App. 2d 611, 51 Cal. Rptr. 6S2(1966).
56. A major contention of this Note, of course, is that the same result (the wrongful
exclusion of a qualified voter) often occurs under ministerial systems as vll because the
making of the challenge is enough to keep from voting those people who do not wish
to expend the extra effort required by the challenge procedures. - f
57. Interview of October 8, 1968, with Thomas Clifford, partner in the law firm of
Jacobs, Jacobs, Grudberg & Clifford, New Haven, Connecticut, and plaintiffs' attorney in
Salter v. Kaplovitz, No. 1116581 (New Haven, Conn., Superior Court, June 18, 1968).
58. See notes 79 & 80 infra.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966); 18
U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964).
60. Note, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: An Evaluation, 3 HARv. Cry. RIcGIss-CIV.
Lm. L. REv. 357 (1968), especially 862 n.20.
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regulations for conducting elections of federal officials,01 it has only re-
cently been established that the Congress may also supervise local elec-
tions.62 Section 11 (a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,03 which applies
to all elections, 64 penalizes election officials who "refuse to permit any
person to vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of this Sub-
chapter or is otherwise qualified to vote."65 Thus, an election official
who used the challenge procedures willfully to reject a voter qualified
under state law would come within this federal prohibition.
Section 11(b) of the 1965 Act prohibits actions which "intimidate
-.. any person for voting or attempting to vote"'0 in state as well as
federal elections. One federal district court, however, has held 11(b)
unenforceable against individual acts of discrimination, in an opinion
which has never been explicitly overruled.07 Nevertheless, there is good
reason to believe that higher courts would probably hold any know-
61. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4; United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States
v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Ex Parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
62. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), explicitly affirms the power of
Congress to "use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting." 383 U.S. at 324. While the Court was there addressing itself
to the constitutionality under the fifteenth amendment of the procedures established by
the 1965 Voting Rights Act to overcome racial discrimination preventing Southern blacks
from registering and voting, the power to prohibit discrimination of a non-racial character
would be encompassed within the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court has had frequent occasion of late to hold that all voters must be treated
equally in state as well as federal elections. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 86 (1962). "Undeniably,
the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote,
in state as well as federal elections . . . And history has seen a continuing expansion of
the scope of the right of suffrage in this country." 377 US. at 554-55. The Congress has
broad powers under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment to pass legislation
designed to enforce the guarantees of the equal protction clause. Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(a) (Supp. II, 1966).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c(a), 19731(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1966).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(a) (Supp. I, 1966) (emphasis added).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (Supp. II, 1966).
67. United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1966). Although Harvey was
never appealed, there are two reasons to doubt its continuing validity. First, Districtjudge West rendered his opinion on February 4, 1966, a month after the oral arguments
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1968) (see note 62 supra), and a month
before the Supreme Court's decision in that case. Although the Court stated that South
Carolina's attack on Section 11 was "premature," 383 U.S. at 317, it upheld sections of
the Voting Rights Act which established a broad system of supervision and control by
federal officials over state elections, including, by necessity, the actions of private citizens.
Second, Judge West held Section 11(b) unenforceable under a narrow reading of the
fifteenth amendment. In his view, Congress can legislate against denial of voting rights
on account of race "by the United States or by any State" but not by private citizens.(In Harvey, defendants were plantation owners accused of terminating share-cropping
and tenant farming agreements and evicting Negroes who registered to vote.) Under
the Court's decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Congress appears to have the
power to legislate against private conduct as well as state action if that is necessary
to enforce the fifteenth amendment. See Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Pro-
motion of Human Rights-Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 91, 102 (1966).
Whatever is taken to be the rule regarding discrimination under the fifteenth amend'
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ingly wrongful challenge, 6 made with the intent to deter the free exer-
cise of the franchise, a violation of Section 11(b).00 Injured voters can
also collect damages under the federal statute which forbids interfer-
ence with rights and privileges protected by the Constitution of the
United States.70
ment, similar language in the fourteenth amendment has been consistently interpreted
to cover basically private action. See Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and Cali-fornia's Proposition 14--Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1966 Terin, 81 -LRv. L. Pi.
69 (1967). In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), six Justices expressed the view
that under the enforcement provisions of the fourteenth amendment, Congress could
legislate against private as well as state action which deprives individuals of equal pro-
tection. Therefore, Harvey need not bar an application of Section 11(b), read through
the fourteenth amendment, to non-racially-motivated intimidation of voters by private
parties wielding the challenge power.
68. In addition to private citizens, Section 11(b) might be applied to ministerial elec-
tion officials who lack the power actually to "refuse to permit" a person to vote and
therefore would not come within 11(a). Since the ministerial officials are agents of the
state, there would be no objections on "state action" grounds to the application of the
statute to them.
69. In light of legal developments over the past 95 years the Supreme Court is prob-
ably prepared to reverse the position it took in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
In that case the Court struck down a federal statute which penalized election officials
who wrongfully refused votes in local elections. The Court held that before the adoption
of the fifteenth amendment the states could draw up voting rules without restriction
and the amendment allowed Congress to intervene only when "the wrongful refusal [of
a person's vote] ... is because of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Id. at
218. However, the present Court's firmer commitment to the implementation of equal
protection and more realistic view of the voting process would probably lead to a dif-
ferent outcome today. Congress's certain power to regulate harmful conduct not spring-
ing from racial prejudice in federal elections (see note 61 supra) gives rise to an implied
power to regulate other elections. Since both federal and non-federal (local or state)
elections are run by the same state machinery and are likely to be indistinguishable to
the ordinary voter, intimidation (by officials or private citizens) which occurred at local
elections and went unremedied by federal intervention would affect the free exercise of
the franchise at federal elections. The voter who, in one case, found no federal protec-
tion for his right to vote would have little reason to presume that his next attempt to
vote would fare any better.
In passing Section 11(b) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Congress explicitly recognized
the importance of uniformity:
While Article I, Section 4 and the implied power of Congress to prevent corruption
in elections normally apply only to federal elections, and [Section 11(b)] applies to
all elections, these powers are plenary within their scope, and, where intimidation
is concerned, it is impracticable to separate its pernicious effects between federal
and local elections.
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & A nN. NEws, H.R. 436, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., 2462 (1965).
70. 42 US.C. § 1983 (1964). Criminal prosecution for deprivations of rights or con-
spiracies to that end are authorized by 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964).
The right to vote for a federal office holder, in primary as well as general elections., has
been repeatedly affirmed as a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United
States. United States v. Classic, 313 US. 299 (1941); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347(1915). Until recent years a debate raged among scholars and judges over whether the
right to vote in state or local elections is a constitutionally guaranteed right or merely
a privilege granted by the states. Kommers, The Right to Vote and Its Implementation,
39 No=hE DAmE LAw. 368 (1964). For a time the prevailing view was represented by the
opinion in Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744, appeal dismissed, 329 US. 675 (1946):
"The Constitution of the United States has nothing to do with state elections, save as
specially provided in certain of the amendments." Id. at 748. A significant modification
in attitude appeared in Lassiter v. Northampton City Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45(1958), where the Court, in upholding the power of a state to set nondiscriminator)
"standards" for the "right to vote," declared that "the right of suffrage is established
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Nevertheless, the invocation of federal statute does not offer a solu-
tion to the problems posed by wilful misuse of the challenge proce-
dures created by the states. The national government has neither the
resources, the will, nor, at present, the statutory power to police every
polling place in the nation. Federal criminal statutes are subject to
most of the weaknesses71 which make any post-election sanction only a
partial cure for perversion of the challenge power. Moreover, any suc-
cessful remedial system will almost certainly require a simple process
for determining the validity of rights of challenged voters.2 Since the
states have major responsibility for the administration of elections,7"
it is not only logical but proper that they, without relying on federal
measures, should develop and employ controls over the use of voter
challenges.
II. Designing A Model Statute
A. Goals and Limitations
A voter challenge statute must accommodate two conflicting aspects
of society's interest in fair elections by guaranteeing every qualified
and guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 51, citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884). "The principle . . . that the protection of the exercise of this right is within
the power of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other citizens to vote as to the col-
ored citizen; and to the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected against
discrimination. The exercises of the right in both instances is guaranteed by the consti-
tution and should be kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is
necessary." Id. at 655. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the elevation of the right
to vote to the level of "a right or privilege protected by the Constitution," apparently
moved to completion. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart
of representative government." Id. at 555. As the constitutional dimensions of the right
protect it from being denied because of dilution or debasement by malapportionment,
they should guard against its denial by intimidation or coercion through the misuse of
voter challenges.
71. E.g., strict construction, difficulty of proving malice, and so on. See pp. 669-71
supra. On the other hand, U.S. Attorneys are less likely to be subject to the political
pressures which affect the local district attorney.
72. The difficulties which the federal government faces when it attempts to regulate
voting can be seen in the complicated procedures established by Section 12(e) of tile
1965 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(e) (Supp. II, 1966), for counting votes of
persons wrongfully excluded from the polls. Significantly, the section only has effect In
those political subdivisions in which a "Federal examiner" has been stationed pursuant
to Sections 3(a), 4(a), and 6 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 1973a(a), -b(a), -d.
The Voting Rights Act (Section 9) also establishes a method by which any person
registered by the federal examiner can be "challenged." This challenge does not, how-
ever, take place at the polls, but must be made "within ten days after the listing of the
challenged person is made available for public inspection" and be supported by "the
affidavits of at least two persons having personal knowledge of the facts constituting
grounds for the challenge." A hearing officer appointed by the United States Civil Ser-
vice Commission shall determine the challenge within fifteen days after it has been filed,
and a "dearly erroneous" decision of the hearing officer can be reversed by the appro.
priate U.S. Court of Appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 1973g (Supp. II, 1966).
73. Some sections of the 1965 Civil Rights Act introduced the federal government for
the first time into some involvement, though still indirect, with local election adminis-
tration. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a) to -(d), -(f) to -(g), (Supp. II, 1967).
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voter the right to cast a ballot while limiting qualified voters to a sin-
gle ballot and preventing unqualified persons from voting. The goal of
a model statute must be a reasonable balance between an overly restric-
tive system, in which the challenge procedures can be misused to pre-
vent or deter those qualified from voting, and an overly permissive one,
which might allow voting by non-residents, felons, and incompetents,
and "voting the graveyard."74 The characteristics of voting officials and
of voters themselves suggest that the voter challenge system must be
simple and largely self-regulating if it is to achieve this goal and still
maximize the speed with which final and accurate election results can
be obtained. Consequently, certain realities of the electoral process
suggest objectives and limitations which must be recognized in design-
ing a model statute.
First, polling officials are usually political appointees who possess
limited capacity to make complex judgements and who are often open
to outside influences. 75 Decision-making is rendered even more difficult
by the atmosphere of conflict and tension that frequently pervades a
polling place.70 Therefore, local officials should be given a minimum of
74. A number of courts and commentators have pointed out that if a choice has to
be made, it is preferable to allow a fraudulent vote to get by every so often than to
disenfranchise any qualified voter at any time.
I think it would be a far greater menace to the security of this constitutional right
[of voting] if the law regulating its exercise might prevent the vote of a citizen.
duly qualified to cast it, from being received and counted, than that some fraud
might be practiced by a false personation. For in the one case, there would be dis-
enfranchisement of the elector;, while in the other, for the wrong done to the
people, or to the individual, penalties and remedies are provided, and tribunals
exist for their enforcement against a wrongdoer, and for the establishment of the
right."
People v. Bell, 119 N.Y. 175, 179, 23 N.E. 533, 584 (1890). See also 4 Op. ATr'" GL%'. CAL
333, 335 (1944), advising on the reasons for the state's ministerial system:
The boards and inspectors must not permit the hearing of belated inquiries into
qualifications of challenged voters to so disrupt the procedure of voting as to deny,
other persons their right to vote. The chief duty of the Boards on election day is to
supervise voting, and not to take over the functions of the registrar of voters or the
courts. The law contains ample provisions for dealing with the fraudulent voter.
The danger that an occasional improper vote may be cast must be weighed against
the greater evil of disenfranchising qualified voters by dilatory proceedings at the
polls.
75. See J. HAmuS, supra note 4, at 9: "In many cities the election officer is the worst
spoils ridden office of all, and it is not uncommon for it to be the dumping ground
for incompetents who cannot be placed elsewhere. In many cities with strong political
organizations the precinct officers are not merely incompetent, they are often corrupt
. . . "; id. 148-49: "'The registration and election officials, from top to bottom, are fre-
quently incompetent and sometimes corrupt. The bitterest and most unscrupulous parti-
sans are placed in charge, whereas public policy should indicate that they keep hands
off." There is little reason to think that the situation has changed radically in the
twenty-five years since these observations were made.
76. Since most precinct boards have representatives of most of the candidates present.
arguments and heated discussions are common. This can be seen in the New Haven
case, where representatives of the insurgent faction fought bitterly with the organization
officials. For discussion of the undesirability of asking for decision-making under such
drcumstances, see People v. Bell, 119 N.Y. 75, 23 N.E. 533 (1890).
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discretion regarding voter challenges.77
Second, criminal sanctions alone are not a satisfactory safeguard
against misuse of the challenge power.78 Civil damage actions and pro-
visions which make the use of challenges worthless as an instrument of
fraud are needed to prevent the statute's restrictive provisions from be-
ing used to deprive qualified voters of their ballots.
Third, most citizens have little interest in politics 9 and want to vote
as quickly and effortlessly as possible.80 Few will care about the details
and requirements of election statutes or be interested in anything
(whether it be voting or following up a complaint after election day)
which requires extensive knowledge of the law. Therefore, the statute
ought to minimize the possibility that impediments can be placed in
the way of a qualified voter's exercise of the franchise and ought to
provide a system of post-election legal remedies which operates so
far as possible without initiative on the part of the voter.
Fourth, any statute should provide a system which attempts to
avoid both the necessity of judicial intervention to overturn the elec-
tion results or to call a new election and the possibility of long periods
of time during which the election results are uncertain and provisional.
B. Suggested Provisions for a Model Statute"'
Section 1. Grounds for Challenge
Failure to meet any of the following qualifications is a ground upon
which a person attempting to vote may be challenged: [Grounds listed.]
2
77. Election officials do not necessarily oppose such a move. In the words of Nicholas
C. Bonadies, Chief Registrar of the City of Hartford, Connecticut: "I wish they would
take all discretion away from all election officials. We'd be much better off if the statute
would tell us what to do, and we do it, automatically. Things would be easier on us
and better for the voters." Interview in New Britain, Connecticut, Dec. 14, 1968.
78. See note 38 supra on the political influences which lead many district attorneys
not to prosecute.
79. A. CAMPBELL, T. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. SToxrEs, THE AMERICAN VO'7En, 168.87,
215-65 (1960). See generally B. BERELSON, P. LAZARSFELD & W. McPsum, VOTING (1954),
V. 0. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOc RACY (1961).
80. Even such minor hurdles to voting as the provision of fewer registration oppor-
tunities has been shown to reduce the number of voters significantly. Kelley, Ayres &
Bowen, Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First, 61 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 359
(1967).
81. Other model codes have been presented in the past. The Committee on Election
Administration of the National Municipal League, for example, proposed a challenge
system similar to New York's, with provision for questioning by the election officials of
the challenged voter and a final general oath before voting. See J. HAuus, supra note 4,
citing Specification 29 (at 49) and Section 14 of the League's proposal (at 87). The
League's proposal, however, is fairly general, leaving most of the ramifications of voter
challenges untouched.
82. Throughout the Model Statute, material which must be filled in on a state.by-
state basis appears in brackets.
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Comment
This provision will enable both the voter and the challenger, whether
official or private citizen, to ascertain quickly, easily, and with little
chance for confusion the precise grounds for which challenges are per-
mitted. It is designed to remedy a weakness of current election law in
many states which leaves the grounds for challenging wholly unspeci-
fied. 3
In filling in the complete list of possible grounds for challenge in
this section, each state will have to choose between deriving tie list
directly from the qualifications needed to register plus those appro-
priate to protecting the ballot box on election day (for example, re-
peated voting and betting on election day 4) and limiting the basis for
challenge more narrowly.8 5 For instance, a state which did not care to
use the challenge process as a check on the accuracy of the registration
books might specify only "nonregistration," "wrong identity," "lack of
residence," and "repeated voting" as grounds for challenge at the polls,
under the presumption that the registration procedure would screen
out those who were unqualified for other reasons, such as being under-
age, illiterate, an alien, or a felon.
If some of the voting requirements vary for different kinds of elec-
tions, a state could of course list these grounds in conditional form. 0
Section 2. Duty and Power to Challenge
(a) Offlcials.-Members of local election boards shall challenge a voter
whenever they have reasonable grounds to believe that the voter is
not qualified under the laws of this state. No degree of suspicion
less than reasonable grounds for belief shall justify a challenge.
(b) Citizens.-Any citizen may challenge a voter if he has reasonable
grounds to believe the voter is not qualified under the laws of this
state.
Comment
The standard of "reasonable belief" provided here serves to require
initiative by election officials as well as to restrain it; it defines a level
of suspicion above which an election official must challenge and below
83. See note 12 supra.
84. E.g., CAL. ELEctiON ConE § 14240 (West 1961).
85. E-g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24:16-4 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1968).
86. E.g., O. RErv. STAT. § 247A10 (1968) (persons who are not state residents long
enough to be qualified to vote for state offices may nevertheless vote for federal offices).
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which he cannot challenge.87 While, like all standards, it is subject to
differing interpretations, it provides a basis in laymen's language upon
which an election official can judge his own determinations with a good
deal of certainty. Thus, an election official will be aware that he must
have reasons to justify (perhaps in court) his use or non-use of the chal-
lenge power.
The section which permits challenges by citizens is designed to as-
sure that official laxity can be checked by private initiative.,8 Most states
limit those who can be in the polling place to officials, party chal-
lengers or checkers, and persons in the process of voting. Consequently
the average citizen would not be in a position to exercise the challenge
power over every voter. The use of the challenge is not restricted to
the day of the election, however, so citizens who find errors on the
election rolls prior to polling day can make their challenges to the
registrar of voters.8 9 And, the Model Statute should be taken as endors-
ing a liberal view of current state laws on citizens' presence at the polls,
so that a voter should be allowed into the polling place to challenge
the right of a particular person to vote.
Section 3. Challenge Procedure
(a) Challenges at the Polling Place.-
(1) If the challenger is present at the polling place, he shall state
aloud to the challenged voter the grounds for the challenge.
(2) The [official presiding at the polling place9"] shall then read
the statutory voting qualifications applicable to the challenge
aloud to the challenged voter. He shall ask the voter whether
he understands the statutory qualifications and whether he be-
lieves that he meets the qualifications. If the voter's answers
are affirmative, the [presiding official] shall explain the proce-
87. See 4 Op. Arr'Y GEN. CAL. 333 (1944), in which the Attorney General of California
read "probable cause" into that state's challenge procedure. His opinion, however, was
made in the context of a quasi-judicial system; he said that the local election boards
should overrule, as not being made "in good faith," challenges which they believed are
not supported by "probable cause." The opinion also authorized the boards to overrule
summarily all challenges if the number of voters challenged is so great as to clearly pro-
duce long delays, so as to be a denial of the right of any qualified voter to cast his ballot.
To deal with this problem, the Model Statute (which establishes a ministerial system
under which no challenge is summarily overruled or accepted) penalizes knowing devi-
ation from its "reasonable belief" standard with criminal and civil penalties. See Model
Statute § 6 9: comment infra.
88. While private citizens may be able to prevent some voting fraud which is the
product of official complicity with unqualified voters, primary reliance should not be
placed on the challenge prodcedure for this end, but should continue to rest on other
anti-fraud provisions of state election laws.
89. See Model Statute § 3(b) infra.
90. Usually called the "Chairman of the Election Board."
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dures of the following subsections and ask the challenged voter
whether he wishes to vote.
(3) If the challenged voter indicates that he does wish to vote, the
[presiding official] shall record on a numbered affidavit (i) the
names and addresses of the voter and the challenger, (ii) the
qualifications challenged, and (iii) a summary of the reasons
for believing that the challenged voter fails to meet the quali-
fications.
(4) The challenger shall then sign the affidavit following this state-
ment: "I do hereby challenge the right of the above-named
person to vote because, for the reasons set forth above, I be-
lieve that he lacks the specified voting qualifications." If the
challenger, after having the opportunity to alter to his satisfac-
tion the summary of the grounds for his challenge, refuses to
sign this statement, the challenge shall be considered to be
withdrawn, and the voter shall be permitted to vote on an
ordinary ballot. Such withdrawal does not exempt the chal-
lenger from liability under Section 6(b)(1) of this Act.
(5) If the challenger signs the affidavit provided for above, the
voter shall then sign following this statement: "Having read
this affidavit I do hereby swear that to the best of my knowl-
edge I meet the qualifications set forth above."
(6) The affidavit shall carry the following in boldface type:
"Warning: False statements on this affidavit may lead to crim-
inal prosecution."
(7) When the voter has signed the affidavit, he shall be given a
special ballot labeled "Challenged Ballot" with an identifying
number identical to that on the affidavit he has signed; he
shall then be entitled to vote using this ballot.
(8) Challenged ballots shall be counted along with all other bal-
lots, and shall then be delivered to the proper officials as spe-
cified in Section 5.
(9) If the voter admits that he does not meet the qualifications
upon which he has been challenged or declines to cooperate
in the completion of the affidavit, he shall not be permitted to
vote.
(b) Challenges Prior to Election Day.-A challenge may be made prior
to election day at the office of the [head election official for the lo-
cality91], who shall record on a numbered affidavit the information
required in subsection (a)(3), have the challenger sign as required
in subsection (a)(4), and send the affidavit and the numerically
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matching ballot to the appropriate polling place with the other
election supplies; when the voter named on the affidavit presents
himself to vote, the [presiding official] shall read aloud to the chal-
lenged voter the grounds as summarized on the affidavit, and shall,
in all other respects, follow the procedures and requirements as
outlined in subsection (a).
Comment
The procedure outlined here provides election officials with minis-
terial powers alone. There is no requirement for an on-the-spot pro-
duction and inspection of documents, handwriting comparison, or
other investigation. While the challenger, whether an official or a citi-
zen, must be able to state reasonable grounds for the challenge, the is-
suance of a "Challenged Ballot" does not depend on anyone's determi-
nation of how reasonable the grounds are.92 This procedure reduces
the likelihood that an official's innocent error or willful fraud will
prevent a qualified elector from having his vote counted. The system
also minimizes delay in the voting process which might otherwise dis-
courage the voter who does not wish to expend too much time or
energy in casting his ballot.
The keystone of this ministerial system is the use of the affidavit.
The procedures outlined here guarantee that all voters can vote if they
choose to.93 As provided in Section 5 below, a voter's ballot can be dis-
allowed only after his qualifications have been fully investigated by a
body with greater expertise than the local officials at the polls, operat-
ing under conditions more favorable to a rational decision.0" As a safe-
guard against the misuse of the affidavit system, the non-qualified voter
will have to lie under oath before he is given a ballot, in circumstances
which make prosecution easy.95 The deterrent effect of an affidavit re-
91. Usually called the "Registrar of Voters."
92. When acting in his capacity as challenger, an election officer must of course make
an initial decision-whether or not he has "reasonable" ground to challenge. But what-
ever the results of that decision, the officer's conduct in his ministerial capacity Is not
affected, and the issuance of a challenged ballot to any voter who has expressed his
willingness to sign the affidavit is automatic.
93. It is obvious that the effectiveness of this statute as a bar to voter deprivation
depends on widespread voter education; the possibility will continue to exist that indi-
vidual voters, uninformed about their rights, will be intimidated by the challenge and
will leave the polling place without insisting on voting, even though the Act requires in
Section 3(a)(2) that the voter be apprised of the exact ground for the challenge and his
right to a special ballot notwithstanding the objection.
94. Cf. Lane v. Mitchell, 153 Iowa 139, 142, 133 N.W. 381, 383 (1911): "The consti-
tutional right to vote is of high value to voters generally, and they should not be de-
prived of it, except after full investigation by a tribunal with authority to make such
an investigation."
95. On the availability of perjury statutes as a basis for prosecution, see Goetcheus v.
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quirement, as opposed to policing by third parties, has been much de-
bated. The Internal Revenue Service bases its tax collections on self-
policing with various penalties for filing false returns. Jurisdictions
which have recently changed from an investigative to an affidavit system
in the determination of eligibility for public assistance have found no
increase in falsification of applications."" The deterrent effect of the
false statements provisions in the case of voter challenges might well
exceed those of the income tax returns and welfare application because
the percentage of the affidavits actually investigated will probably ex-
ceed that of either of the other two systems.
The Model Statute does not provide for challenges to absentee bal-
lots because the statute focuses on the use of the challenge power to
intimidate prospective voters. As the absentee voter is unaware of any
challenge of his right to vote, the problem of coercion does not arise.
While the penalty provisions of Section 6 are therefore inapposite, it
would be advisable to have the Board of Election Inquiry pass on chal-
lenged absentee ballots so that they will receive the same consideration
as other challenged ballots. Such a procedure could easily be incorpo-
rated into a state's absentee ballot provisions, since most states provide
that the ballot be returned in an envelope on which the voter attests
to his right to cast the ballot.97 If the ballot were challenged, the vot-
ing officials could mark the ballot and envelope with an identifying
number and record the challenger's name and grounds for challenge
on the envelope, which could perform the function of the affidavit un-
der the Model Statute.
Mathewson, 61 N.Y. 420, 436 (1875): "Most of the questions that may tend to excite a
momentary irritation caused by the challenge are disposed for the time being by (the
voter's) oath. If he willfully swvears falsely, he is liable, on conviction, to a suitable
punishment." See also People ex rel. Stapleton v. Bell, 119 N.Y. 175, 187-88, 23 N.E.
533, 537 (1890):
Practically, the law leaves it to the conscience of the person offering to vote to decide
whether he can or will do so when his right is challenged . . . . The law provides
for the punishment of a person who falsely personates a registered voter, and the
proposed elector, who is challenged for that cause, if he persists in his attempt to
vote, may accomplish his purpose, but at the peril consequent upon false swearing
and of false personation.
See also 4 Op. A'rr'y GEN'. CAL. 333, 335 (1944).
96. See Simonds, Declarations and Incentives: New Approaches to Public Assistance,
PUBLIc WELFARE, Jan. 1968, at 67, 70: "Based on our experience to date, the self-deda-
ration system has had no effect on the incidence of errors nor the percentage of ineli-
gibles; on the contrary, there is some evidence that there may be even fewer errors and
fewer ineligibles with self-declaration." See also Note, Eligibility Determinations in
Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 1307, 1345 (1967); WVLFARE DECLARATION RFSEARCii PRojEcr, Crr' UNtrsrr-
OF NEW YoRK, USE OF "DECLARATION" IN DF-.RMINING ELIGI31LITY For PunLic AssITANce
(1968).
97. See, e.g., N.Y. EECIoN LAw § 117 et seq. (McKinney 1964); TEx. ELETo. CoDzE
art. 5.05 (1967).
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Section 4. Board of Election Inquiry
(a) Party Nominees.-From a list of five nominees submitted by the
state chairman of each political party, the [chief election officer of
the state98 ] shall appoint for three-year terms to the Board of Elec-
tion Inquiry two members of each political party which received
more than 20 per cent of the votes cast for any statewide office in
the election immediately preceding the date of appointment.
(b) Nonpartisan Member.-At their first meeting, the members of the
Board thus appointed shall appoint one additional, nonpartisan
member to the Board for a term concurrent with their own, but
no other business shall be conducted until this member has as-
sumed his duties; if the Board fails to appoint this nonpartisan
member within one month, the [chief judge of the highest court
of the state] shall immediately appoint the nonpartisan member;
in this section a "nonpartisan" means a person not affiliated with
or registered as a member of any political party.
(c) Vacancies.-A vacancy on the Board shall be filled in the same
manner as the former member was appointed under subsection (a)
or (b).
(d) Holding Concurrent Office.-During his term of office, no mem-
ber of the Board shall be an officer of any political party organiza-
tion or hold any elective or appointive office in federal, state, or
local government, other than membership in the judiciary.
(e) Powers and Duties.-The Board shall be able to subpoena records
and witnesses, administer oaths, take sworn testimony, formulate
and enforce rules of procedure, and issue adjudicatory orders; shall
employ and direct such investigatory staff as the legislature shall
from time to time provide for; and shall make final determination
of the validity of the challenged ballots submitted to it within one
month following the election. A majority vote of the entire Board
shall be required to exclude any challenged ballot.
(f) Proceedings.-All hearings of the Board shall be open to the public,
and the record of the Board's determinations shall be available for
inspection by the public; witnesses before the Board may consult
with counsel.
98. In many states, the chief election officer is the secretary of state, who is elected
in a statewide election.
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Comment
The existence of a Board of Election Inquiry provides a method for
ruling on affidavits as a matter of course and without asking the voter
to take any initiative whatsoever. 9 Further, it is more practical to give
such a Board the responsibility of investigating and passing on affidavits,
rather than burdening the prosecutor's office with investigating them
and the courts with ruling on them.100
Insuring that the swing member of the Board will be nonpartisan
and that among government employees or officeholders only judges
may be members of the Board should help to raise the Board itself
above politics. Since the Board members perform a state-wide function,
in reaching their determinations they will probably be less subject than
the district attorneys to the sorts of political influences which are strong-
est at the local level and which interfere with fair and unbiased consid-
eration of the facts in voting rights cases. Moreover, proceedings and
decisions by the Board are open to public scrutiny as further assurance
of honest determination of challenges.
Section 5. Determination of Election Result
(a) Non-Challenge Contest.-If the number of challenged ballots is
less than the number of votes by which the total vote for the lead-
ing candidate exceeds that of his closest opponent, then-
(1) The leading candidate shall immediately be declared the win-
ner of that election contest by [the appropriate body'01], and
(2) The affidavits corresponding to such ballots shall be delivered
to the appropriate district attorney.
(b) Challenged Contests.-If the number of challenged ballots is
greater than the number of votes by which the total vote for the
leading candidate exceeds that of his closest opponent, then-
(1) The challenged ballots and corresponding affidavits relevant
99. This system is superior to the Washington system, which requires that the voter
or the challenger request an investigation. See p. 667 supra.
100. Because of the importance of achieving finality of election results, no judicial
review of Board decisions is provided for. Those states which already provide for judicial
review of determinations of state agencies and which do not wish to provide an excep-
tion for the Board of Inquiry here should at least set a specific time limit for appeals
and decisions on such appeals. The judicial relief of mandamus should nonetheless be
preserved for use against a recalcitrant Board which failed to perform its statutory duty
to pass on all challenged ballots within 30 days following the election. See Model Statute
§ 5(b)(5) infra. This will serve to prevent a Board from using a 2-2 split vote with one
abstention as an excuse not to act; the Board will have to establish a rule as to the mean-
ing of such votes (e.g., any motion, such as "This Challenged Ballot shall be excluded."
fails to pass, if it receives an evenly divided vote).
101. Usually called the "Board of Canvassers."
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to each such contest shall be delivered by [the appropriate
local election official'0 2] to the Board of Election Inquiry as
soon as the ballots have been counted;
(2) Each such contest shall be known as a "challenged contest," and
no declaration of the winner shall be made until the Board
completes its findings;
(3) The Board shall investigate the statements made in each affi-
davit to determine the validity of the matching challenged
ballot; by registered mail it shall offer each challenged voter,
challenger and [official presiding at the election place'03] an
opportunity to appear at the hearing on his affidavit, and if
necessary it may subpoena him to appear;
(4) When its investigation reveals that the voter was properly
challenged, the Board shall cancel the ballot which bears the
same identifying number as that voter's affidavit and shall sub-
tract the votes appearing on that ballot from the totals of the
appropriate candidates in all challenged contests;
(5) The Board shall determine the validity or invalidity of every
affidavit in a challenged contest within 30 days after the elec-
tion; it shall then declare the final result for that contest, and
the candidate receiving the largest number of legal votes shall
be declared the winner; and
(6) In the case of each affidavit which discloses an erroneous chal-
lenge or a voter's false statement, the Board shall deliver to
the appropriate district attorney all evidence relating to such
false affidavit, and the district attorney shall, in each case,
either prosecute under Section 6 the person who has made
false statement or an erroneous challenge, or he shall submit
to [the appropriate committee of the state legislature] a public
report explaining his failure to prosecute.
(c) Propositions and Referenda.-As used in this section, the term
"candidate" includes the affirmative and negative positions ("Yes"
and "No," or "For" and "Against" votes) on propositions and ref-
erenda.
Comment
This section emphasizes the importance of achieving finality in the
102. The local official to whom the actual ballots are returned is usually the Registrar
of Voters.
103. Usually called the "Chairman of the Election Board."
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election result as quickly as possible. In a great many cases, the num-
ber of people challenged will not be large enough to affect the result
of the election; 104 therefore, it would be unnecessary to delay an-
nouncement of the result until all challenges have been investigated.
Also provided here is a method of ruling on all affidavits and declaring
a new winner, if such is the case, without the necessity of calling a new
election. The Board is able to isolate the illegal ballots, which bear
the same number as the affidavits, and subtract those votes from the
appropriate candidates.10 5 The system proposed here seems less offen-
sive to the concept of the secret ballot than the Maine system, which
utilizes no affidavits.'10 There, the name of the challenged person is
written directly on the ballot, while in the proposed system, the ballots
are identified numerically. Only when the vote is found to have been
cast illegally does the Board of Inquiry match up a numbered affidavit
(on which the unqualified voter's name of course appears) with a num-
bered ballot.
While the initial investigation and hearing, as well as all determina-
tions relating directly to the election results, are placed in the hands
of the Board, prosecution for misuse of the challenge or voting with-
104. Because of the "reasonable belief" standard there will probably be many fewer
challenges than is presently the case. Therefore, in most elections there wiU in all likeli-
hood be no contests in which the number of challenged ballots is large enough to affect
the outcome. The most burdensome task which could fall on the Board of Election
Inquiry would be to have to review all challenged ballots, which would occur if the
dose election contest were for a state-wide office. Large states may find that it may be
necessary to divide the state geographically and establish an additional Board of Election
Inquiry to handle the work load expeditiously. However, the creation of more than two
Boards would be inadvisable as the elevated and non-political nature of the statc-wide
body would be significantly reduced as its jurisdiction is decreased and it gets doser and
closer to local politics.
105. This remedy is an improvement over the one available in Jurisdictions which
have numbered ballots but which require judicial determination of election disputes.
Typically, the election law in these states provides that the ballot of the challenged voter
be marked (in a concealed manner) with the number corresponding to the voter's poll
list number. E.g., Mlica. Com'. LAws ANN. §§ 168.745-46 (paper ballots), 168.783 (voting
machines) (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.95 (1967). If an election is contested, the judge
may examine the ballots to identify by number those which were cast by persons whom
he has determined were not qualified to vote; he must "immediately" conceal the identi-
fying numbers again. Mxcii. Co.st. LAws ANN. §§ 168.747-49 (1967). It is undcear whether
the judge in a quo wanranto proceeding, id. § 600.4505 (1968), WIs. STAT. ANN. § 294.04
(1958), can exclude the ballots of unqualified voters. A court clearly has the poler to
exclude or receive improperly marked ballots, Hawkins v. Voisine, 284 ich. 181, 278
N.W. 811 (1938); Attorney General ex rel. Carpenter v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420 (1855-56), but there
is specific statutory provision for the way these ballots should be handled in the counting
process by the board of canvassers. MicH. Cosre. LAw's ANN. § 168.803(1) (1967), VLs. STAT.
ANN. § 7.51(2) (1967). See also ixci. ComP. LAws ANN. § 168.792a(8) (1967).
106. The present system in Maine has a number of other disadvantages which the
Model Statute attempts to overcome. A voter challenged in Maine does not have to take
a sworn oath as to his qualifications; at trial this would make it more difficult to prove
that he voted knowing that he did not meet the qualifications which had been chal-
lenged. There are no provisions for the investigation of challenges in cases not before
the Governor's Council, and there is no standard of "reasonableness" imposed upon the
exercise of the challenge. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 863, 925(1), 1212 (1965).
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out qualification is left to the district attorneys. In cases in which the
challenges could not have affected the election's outcome, the prose-
cutor has complete discretion on whether to investigate or bring
charges. This decision will doubtless be influenced by the number of
challenges, the affidavits' reasonableness on their face, the general po-
litical climate in the locality, and particularly the degree of public con-
cern over fraudulent voting practices. In cases in which the Board of
Inquiry has first ruled on the affidavit, the prosecutor's discretion has
been limited to the extent that he must explain his failure to prosecute
to the legislative committee overseeing election laws. His investigation
might have shown that although a false statement was made, the of-
fending party did not act knowingly. This explanation would not, of
course, alter either the accuracy of the Board of Inquiry's determina-
tions or the continuing validity of the actions based on those determi-
nations. Requiring that the explanation be public should serve to dis-
suade the district attorneys from withholding prosecutions because of
political considerations.1 0 7
Section 6. Criminal Sanctions and Civil Damages
(a) False Affidavit.-Any voter who signs an affidavit and votes, know-
ing that he lacks the qualifications stated by the challenger on the
affidavit, is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for 30 days or
a fine of $100, or both.
(b) Knowing Misuse of Challenge Power; Knowing Failure to Accept
Vote.-
(1) Liability.-
(A) Anyone who challenges a qualified voter on election day
knowing that he does not have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the voter challenged lacks the stated qualifica-
tions to vote, or
(B) Any election official who knowingly fails or refuses to
challenge a person who lacks qualifications to vote, or
(C) Any election official who knowingly fails or refuses to
accept the vote of a person who has expressed his willing-
ness to sign an affidavit and cast a challenged ballot, or
who in any other manner knowingly fails to follow the
procedures and requirements of section 3 of this Act,-
shall be liable upon conviction to imprisonment for up to one
year or a fine of up to $1000, or both, and shall be civilly li-
107. See note 38 supra.
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able to the voter who has been wrongly challenged or de-
prived of his rights under this Act, or to any candidate who
was defeated because votes were improperly excluded or re-
ceived, for compensatory and punitive damages of not less
than $50 and reasonable litigation expenses.
(2) Effect of Conviction.-In a civil action under subsection (b)
(1), proof that the defendant was criminally convicted for the
conduct in question shall be conclusive on the issue of li-
ability.
(3) Presumption for Unchallenged Votes.-In a civil action
brought by a defeated candidate under subsection (b)(1), proof
of knowing failure to challenge an unqualified voter shall give
rise to the rebuttable presumption that the vote was cast for
plaintiff's opponent.
(c) Negligent Misuse of Challenge Power; Failure to Accept Vote.-
(1) Anyone who signs an affidavit, as provided in Section 3(a)(4)
of this Act, challenging a qualified voter without reasonable
grounds to believe that the voter lacks the stated qualifications
to vote, or
(2) Any election official who fails or refuses to accept the ballot
of any qualified voter,--
shall be civilly liable to the voter who has been wrongly challenged
or prevented from voting, or to any candidate who was defeated
because votes were improperly excluded, for liquidated damages
of $50 and reasonable litigation expenses.
(d) Ineligibility for Offices.-Any person convicted under subsection
(b) shall be ineligible to hold any elective or appointive position
in town, city, county, or state government for ten years following
the date of conviction.
(e) Statute of Limitations.-Prosecutions and civil actions under this
section must be commenced within one year of the election in
which the violations allegedly occurred.
Comment
Since the affidavit-challenged ballot system greatly reduces the likeli-
hood of politically motivated misuse of the challenge procedures, the
need for severe penalties is reduced. Nevertheless, the Model Statute,
unlike the vast majority of election laws, does provide deterrents
against abuse at each point in the challenge process, for two reasons.
Even an attempted misuse of the election laws injures the public; and
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some persons may attempt to affect the election results by circumvent-
ing the affidavit system entirely.
As the ballot of an unqualified challenged voter can do no harm,
subsection (a) provides comparatively light criminal penalties.108 The
provision is applicable only when the voter proceeds to vote despite
his knowledge that he lacks the qualifications on which he has been
challenged; his lack of any additional qualifications would be dealt
with under the jurisdiction's other provisions on voting fraud, as would
the actions of any unqualified but unchallenged voter.
The major target of the penalty provisions is the election official or
party pollwatcher who fails to perform his duties or who challenges
persons in the hope that they will be dissuaded from voting at all. In
addition to the criminal penalties, the model statute contains two stan-
dards of civil liability.109 The first covers those who knowingly misuse
the challenge power. In arriving at its award of damages, above the
minimum of $50, the jury should consider not only the harm suffered
by the plaintiff" 0 but also the willfulness of the defendant's acts as in-
dicating harm to the public. Since such a civil suit may follow a crim-
inal action against the same defendant for the same conduct, the plain-
tiff is permitted to use the verdict in the criminal case"' as conclusive
on the issue of liability in his civil suit.
108. If the perjury provisions in the jurisdiction cover "sworn" but unnotarized, out-
of-court statements such as the challenged voter's affidavit, a voter who lied In order to
vote might also be subject to the penalties for perjury, although this would seem uan-
necessary and, as a matter of policy, unwise (in light of the improbability that his
conduct will have harmed anyone).
109. The civil remedies are spelled out in detail in the Model Statute in the hope
that they will be more effective as complements to the criminal penalties than are tepresent common law remedies (see p. 669 supra), which apparently remain unknown
to most voters. Most states leave the injured voter to rely on these remedies rather than
conferring a statutory right to damages for election official misconduct. Even where the
availability of a civil action is known, most voters are dissuaded from suing because of
the difficulty of proving damages and the expense of bringing a suit. Cf. Morris v. Colo-
rado Midland Ry., 48 Colo. 147, 109 P. 430 (1910), discussed in note 46 supra. The Model
Statute, however, provides for minimum liquidated damages as well as reasonable liti-
gation expenses. Model Statute §§ 6(b)(1), 6(c).
110. In light of the studies on the value most citizens attach to their individual vote(see note 79 supra), voters would most probably collect only the minimum fifty dollars
damages. But see note 46 supra for an unusual assertion of higher valuation. A candidate,
however, might be able to attach a much higher value to his loss of the election result.ing from ballots which he can convince the jury were improperly received or excluded.
The statutory scheme is designed to reduce the necessity for election contest suits beingbrought to upset election results. Clearly they are superfluous in the case of challenged
ballots, which are handled by the Board of Election Inquiry; in the case of voters who
were kept from voting or who were wrongly allowed to vote but not challenged, the
existence of civil damages under the Model Statute provides an alternative to defeated
candidates which may be more effective in detering official misconduct. Damage awards
could be based on campaign expenses or other provable costs or, if it is not considered
too speculative, the monetary value of the office lost.
111. This verdict would be arrived at according to the higher standard of "beyond
a reasonable doubt." An acquittal in the criminal case, therefore, would not be conclu-
sive in the defendant's favor.
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The civil cause of action provided for in subsection (c) specifies li-
quidated damages of fifty dollars plus expenses" 2 for two kinds of vio-
lations. First, a challenger is permitted to question a voter briefly (in
effect, "challenging" him without making a formal objection) when he
has genuine doubts as to the voter's qualifications which do not amount
to "reasonable grounds to believe" the voter unqualified.11 But, should
the challenger go so far as to sign the affidavit, thereby causing the
voter to cast a challenged ballot,114 while lacking "reasonable grounds,"
he would run afoul of subsection (c)(1), which in effect, establishes a
negligence standard. 1 5 The second provision of subsection (c) imposes
strict liability on election officials who refuse to allow any qualified
person to vote. Full compliance with the statute is so important that
this civil penalty will attach although the official claims to have acted
only negligently and not wilfully.10
These civil remedies have been provided primarily to allow for ci-
vilian surveillance of the challenge procedures, in light of the possi-
bility that political obstacles may forestall criminal prosecutions. In
most instances, this role of "private attorney general" will be played
by the voter who has been wrongly challenged or deprived of a ballot.
The losing candidate"17 has standing to sue only when the total of the
112. Should the plaintiff lose his case, the defendant election official under the law of
most states would be entitled only to court costs, which do not generally include reason-
able attorney's fees. The Model Statute accepts this limitation in order to minimize the
financial risk for aggrieved voters and thus encourage them to bring suits. The limitation
is not as harsh on the prevailing election official as it seems, for in most, if not all, cases
local party organizations will provide attorneys or pay attorney's fees and other legal
expenses. In the New Haven case, for example, the defendants were defended by an
attorney supplied by the State Central Committee of the Democratic Party.
113. While this procedure may facilitate voting (since in many cases it will be easy
to satisfy the challenger that his doubts, though raised in good faith, are misplaced.
thereby allowing the voter to receive a ballot or vote by machine without going through
a formal challenge), diligence must be exercised to make sure that challengers do not
misuse their right to make these informal challenges. For instance, a pattern of baseless
challenges on the part of an official or group of officials (especially should they annoy
voters enough that some decide not to vote at all) would be clear evidence of challenges
made with knowledge that they are unreasonable, a violation of Section 6(b)(1)(A).
114. The real danger is not that the voter will have to cast a challenged ballot, but
that he will regard the whole procedure as being too much bother to go through merely
to vote. (See notes 79 & 80 supra.) Ironically, the qualified voter may be more easily dis-
suaded from voting by a false challenge than the unqualified voter is by a legitimate one,
since the qualified voter will likely be more piqued at having his right to vote w-rongly
doubted.
115. While Section 6(b)(1)(A) provides that the challenger is not liable if the jury is
convinced that he believed his grounds to be reasonable when he voiced the challenge
(a subjective standard), for liability to attach under Section 6(c)(1) the jury need only
find that the grounds are, in fact, unreasonable (an objective standard).
116. The strict liability standard of Section 6(c)(2) is designed to encourage officials
to comply fully with all their duties under the statute. Thus, in addition to damages
for an outright violation of a voter's rights (such as complete refusal to allow a voter
to cast even a challenged ballot), a qualified voter could collect liquidated damages from
an official who, after the voter was challenged, failed to inform him of his right to cast
a challenged ballot. See Model Statute §§ 3(a)(2) to (a)(4) supra.
117. The reference in Section 5(c) of the Model Statute to other meanings of the
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illegal voters who went unchallenged and the qualified voters who were
turned away 18 is larger than his opponent's margin of victory. Of course,
the unique nature of the second offense in subsection (b)"0 makes civil
recovery there quite unlikely. There being no injured voter, the only
potential plaintiff would be a losing candidate who can show that the
officials let people vote despite reasonable grounds to believe them un-
qualified, to a total large enough to affect the election result. So that
the candidate will not have to rely on the testimony of hostile wit-
nesses, subsection (b)(3) creates the presumption that persons who
voted illegally did so for the plaintiff's opponent. 20
The remedies which the Model Statute provides candidates who have
been injured by misuse of the challenge procedures obviate the need
for new elections in certain cases.' 21 Violations of subsections (b)(1)(B)
and (C), however, go beyond the scope of the challenge process and
touch upon instances of ordinary election fraud (officials permitting
unqualified persons to vote or denying the ballot to qualified voters).
Therefore, additional remedies for these infractions may be found in
other provisions of state election law, particularly those dealing with
election contests, which should remain in force or be enacted. 22
word "candidate" does not carry over to the penalty section; no citizen or group of citi-
zens is empowered to sue should a proposition or referendum which they supported be
defeated.
118. Although the voter who is wrongly challenged yet persists in voting can collect
under Sections 6(b)(1)(A) and 6(c)(1), for obvious reasons the defeated candidate, under
all provisions of Section 6, can collect only if the qualified challenged voter (who must
be able to testify that he would have voted for the plaintiff) did not cast his ballot. Also,
the candidate cannot claim to be injured by the votes of unqualified challenged voters,
since their ballots would have been removed by the Board of Inquiry before the final
result was declared.
119. Subsection (1)(B) is unique in that it punishes the failure of an official to chal-
lenge an unqualified voter. There being no affidavit or challenged ballot, an action here
would not come through the channels of the Board of Election Inquiry; instead, prose-
cution would depend on a complaint from an independent source.
120. The strength of the presumption can be seen in that to overcome it the defen-
dant would have to rely on the testimony of persons whose credibility would be greatly
reduced by the proof that they had voted illegally. The presumption is also necessary to
avoid the fifth amendment problems which would be involved in the illegal voter's
having to take the stand for the plaintiff to make out his injury; that lie will have to
do so if the defendant is to overcome the presumption leaves the burden on the defen-
dant to persuade the voter to testify, which is proper in that the defendant's knowing
failure to challenge an unqualified voter is culpable no matter for whom the voter cast
his ballot.
121. For the advantages in avoiding new elections, see p. 672 supra.
122. Many state election contest provisions provide for the voiding of an election for
a number of reasons, including "when illegal votes have been received, or legal votes
rejected at the polls sufficient to change the result." N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:29-Ie, 19:29-9
(1964); CAL. ELEcrIONS CODE §§ 20021e, 20086 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 32-1001, 32-1030
(1952); see p. 672 supra. Once the election is set aside, that section of the election
law dealing with filling vacant offices by judicial decree or through the calling of a
special election becomes applicable. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:3-25 to -29 (1964); NED. REV.
STAT. §§ 32-1037 et seq. (1952). However, for these remedies to be generally effective, It is
necessary that the laws be modified so that the loser would not always have to prove that
all the voters illegally excluded would have voted for him or that all those illegally
accepted voted against him. Whenever the total number of votes illegally received or
692
Protecting the Right to Vote
One addition to the civil liability sections might be a provision hold-
ing the state jointly and severably liable as defendant with convicted
officials in order to insure that all successful plaintiffs will be able to
collect the amount of damages to which they are entitled.M This might
also serve as incentive for the state to select its election officials more
carefully. However, the drawbacks to state civil liability argue for its
omission from the Model Statute. First, such a system might in fact be
a disincentive to the state's criminally prosecuting an election official,
since the resulting conviction would be conclusive on the issue of li-
ability in the civil suit, where the state would be a defendant. Secondly,
the potential financial burden of civil liability may be politically un-
palatable to state legislatures. 12 4 In any event state liability is not
needed for the process to operate successfully. The chief aim of the
civil liability sections is punitive, not compensatory; they serve pri-
marily to deter abuse of the challenge process by providing an avenue
for "private attorneys general," not to repay voters or candidates an
amount equivalent to the harm suffered.
Subsection (d) should be an additional deterrent to the election offi-
cial who is tempted to use the challenge power for political purposes.
Most such officials are either employed by government or are heavily
dependent on temporary patronage jobs obtained through local polit-
ical connections. They would undoubtedly be far less willing to harass
individual voters for political purposes if it meant risking loss of fu-
ture job opportunities.
It should be noted, however, that provisions for criminal and civil
liability, no matter how severe, cannot be relied upon to prevent all
abuse of the challenge power. Rather, the most effective deterrent is
to make the use of the challenge power profitless as an instrument of
election fraud. This statute attempts to attain that goal through the
affidavit-challenged ballot system.
excluded exceeds the winning candidate's margin of victory, a new election should be
ordered, unless the winning or losing candidate can prove that he would have received
the highest number of legal votes. See also Model Statute § 6(b)(3) supra; p. 692 supra.
123. While it is unlikely that most election officials would be judgment proof on a
single $50 judgment, some might be unable to pay the amounts adjudged in cases giving
rise to punitive and compensatory damages for candidates, or in cases iniolving suits b)
a substantial number of voters.
124. Even without state liability the operations of the Board of Election Inquiry would
impose additional costs upon the state, though the state might anticipate savings on the
costs of new elections (rendered unnecessary in cases involving illegal challenges alone).
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HYBRID SYSTEMS 12 9
California, Local election board decides all challenges except identity (challenged
Montana voter can vote after taking an oath), "repeated voting" (can vote after
125. For specific citations see note 14 supra.
126. The only ground permitted for challenges in Maryland is identity.
127. Pennsylvania operates under a signature comparison system, with the members
of the local election board determining whether the signature of the challenged voter
is the same as that on the registration sheet.
128. For statutory citations see note 16 supra.
129. For statutory citations see note 19 supra.
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oath), and felony conviction (can vote after oath if an authenticated
record of pardon or two witnesses are produced).
Connecticut Local election board decides all challenges except "repeated voting" (can
vote if a sworn affidavit is signed).
Delaware Local election board decides challenges for identity; voter challenged for
bribery can vote after taking an oath.
Missouri Local election board decides all challenges except identity (can vote after
signing affidavit and getting affidavits from two precinct voters).
New Mexico If challenged for non-residence, ballot placed in separate envelope, but
counted; if name is omitted from list, can vote if affidavits of registration
are presented; all other challenges determined by the local election board.
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